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Introduction
Beside the traditional "command and control" approach and the market based instruments to regulate the environment, voluntary actions for abating pollution have been undertaken by …rms. One reason for "self-regulation"is the emergence of green consumers, at least in developed nations, willing to pay a higher price for products of less impact on the environment. 1 Firms, expecting higher pro…ts by di¤erenti-ating their products in terms of environmental performance and thereby charging a higher price to these green consumers, have voluntarily reduced pollution. To be e¤ective, such a di¤erentiation in terms of environmental performance has to be credibly signalled to consumers. In e¤ect, environmental quality of a product which involves production process, product components and raw materials is usually observable neither before nor after purchase and use, being a credence attribute of the product. We focus our analysis on environmental quality but this could apply also to problems like child labor, fair trade, etc; whenever consumers care about features of the good that are not observable from consumption. The most e¤ective way to solve this type of information problem and to signal product quality is to rely on third party certi…cation (Cason and Gangadharan, 2002) . Certi…cation is a process where a third party veri…es the ful…lments of a …rm to certain criteria or standards.
Certi…cation programs can be sponsored and/or administrated by governments or private companies (for pro…t and non-pro…t). These organizations provide information in di¤erent ways. While private companies tend to provide information by setting up voluntary codes of conduct and then providing labels to …rms that comply, the regulator has the possibility to exclude from the market products that do not ful…ll some standards.
Among the voluntary schemes promoted by private …rms we have (eco)-labels.
Eco-labels signal the products of less impact from production and use on the environment and can command a higher market price. This price premium gives producers an economic incentive to incur the additional costs associated with meeting the standards (Blend, p.1). Eco-labels provide an opportunity to inform consumers about product characteristics that may not be readily apparent. 2 The aim of our paper is to understand the multiplicity and the diversity of the institutions regulating environmental quality. We study the welfare implications of the coexistence of public and private environmental quality certi…cation schemes.
The public certi…er is a regulator, the private certi…er may be either an NGO 3 which is a non pro…t institution or a for-pro…t private certi…er (PC). 4 These certi…ers mainly di¤er in the way of providing information and in the mandatory character of their certi…cation schemes. The regulator maximizes social welfare and sets a mandatory minimum quality standard. The NGO and the private certi…er propose a non compulsory label. The NGO maximizes environmental quality whereas the private certi…er maximizes her pro…t. The NGO and the PC may use green advertisement to promote the label. The green advertisement aims at educating (persuading) consumers to buy more environmentally friendly goods. It is widely observed that private certi…ers use the media to make consumers aware of the impact of buying polluting products, among other green issues.
Our paper builds mainly on the literature of self-regulation and certi…cation.
We focus mainly on Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) , Alexander and Harding (2003) and Heyes and Maxwell (2004) . Alexander and Harding (2003) also compare public and private certi…cation schemes but they rather focus on …rms' incentives to adhere to a label provided by a private cert…er. Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) compare the performance of a privately funded certi…cation against a public funded certi…cation.
Our focus goes beyond the incentives of the monopolist to voluntarily adhere to a private label, moreover, we study the incentives of a public or private (for-pro…t and not for pro…t) certi…er to participate in the market and we allow for strategic interaction between them.
The closest to us in spirit is Heyes and Maxwell (2004) . They compare the environmental and welfare implications of having either a public compulsory policy (a MQS) set by a World Environmental Organization (WEO) or a voluntary label certi…cation set by an NGO. We di¤er in their approach by including in our analysis the persuasion made by the private certi…er through the green advertisement. As 3 Examples of non-pro…t institutions awarding eco-labels can be found in the Global Ecolabelling Network (GEN), an international non-pro…t association of third-party, environmental performance labelling organizations. 4 Ecocert is an example of a for-pro…t private certi…er. It highlights the organic attributes of a product by delivering a label to producers that ful¢ ll some environmental criteria. For more information on Ecocert see http://www.ecocert.com. Another example is the Scienti…c Certi…cation Systems (SCS), a commercial …rm whose Environmental division certi…es a wide variety of claims related to environmental achievement in product manufacturing and natural resource extraction. a consequence, we develop a vertical di¤erentiation model à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) with consumers di¤erentiated by their willingness to pay for environmental quality and a multi-product (quality) monopoly.
The green advertisement can be an informative or a persuasive instrument. Informative advertisement only conveys information about the product attributes (Ibanez and Stenger, 2000 and Petrakis et al., 2005) . We rather follow the second strand of the literature where advertisement, done by the labeler, is persuasive.
Persuasive advertisement convince consumers to buy more environmentally friendly goods. Similar to Yu (2005) we stress the relevance of persuasion to shift policy towards the ideal outcome of the NGO. The green advertisement increases the utility of consumers buying the label independent of the quantity of consumers buying it.
In this sense it is not a social norm (Lombardini-Riipinen, 2002) . It is rather an individual norm but di¤ers from the work of Brekke et al. (2003) as we do not compute any morally ideal behavior. The e¤ect of such an advertisement on consumers'preferences is taken into account when the regulator interacts with a private certi…er. Otherwise the optimal standard policy would be misrepresented (Bar-Gill and Fershtman, 2005) . When comparing the MQS with the NGO label we study the indirect e¤ects of the green advertisement on prices and quality. Comparisons are also made when the advertisement level is set at zero.
We …rst look at scenarios where there is only one certi…er in the market and we make social welfare comparisons. The NGO sets, in all cases, a higher quality level than the PC or the regulator. Afterwards, we allow for interactions between the certi…ers and look at the changes of optimal standard setting in the presence of a private ecolabel alternative and green advertisement. When the regulator is alone in the market the MQS corrects the externality problem by increasing average environmental quality. When the regulator interacts with a private certi…er the MQS decreases average environmental quality, since it decreases demand for the high quality variant. The role of the MQS, when interacting with the NGO or the PC, is rather to correct for the excessive di¤erentiation in order to increase consumer surplus and pro…ts. We show that there is less public intervention in the presence of an eco-label alternative.
When the regulator interacts with a private certi…er, the green advertisement decreases the scope for public intervention. Optimal standard setting clearly depends on the institution the regulator interacts with.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In section 3, only public certi…cation is available. We study the optimal MQS chosen by the regulator. Section 4 explores the NGO regime. The NGO sets a quality level at which a label is awarded to the monopolist. We study the e¤ect on welfare of the label package constituted by a given level of environmental quality and a level of green advertisement. We next allow for strategic interaction between the regulator and the NGO. Section 5 shows what would be the label settled by a for-pro…t private certi…er. We also explore the consequences on quality when the PC and the regulator interact in the market. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We develop a monopoly model of vertical di¤erentiation. Environmental quality is our vertical di¤erentiation variable. Consumers, then, prefer high environmental quality products to low quality ones when o¤ered at the same price. The supply side consists of a monopoly selling at most two environmental quality variants of its product. The monopoly chooses the quality q of its variants in the range of environmental qualities technically feasible given by [q; q]. The monopoly can charge di¤erent prices for the good to re ‡ect the di¤erential in cost made for environmental quality. The production technology involves marginal cost of production independent of the quantity of good produced but strictly increasing and convex in the environmental quality q and is represented by C(q) = cq 2 .
The demand side of the market consists of a continuum of consumers indexed by . The taste parameter can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality and is uniformly distributed on [ ; ]. Each consumer either buys one unit of the di¤erentiated commodity or does not participate at all in the market. If he does not buy the good, he has a reservation utility which is normalized to zero. Adapting from Cremer and Thisse (1999) , the indirect utility of a consumer of type who buys a variant of perceived environmental quality q at price p is given
where E is the average environmental quality over all consumers. The parameter > 0 measures the marginal social bene…t of the externality associated to the average environmental quality. 5 To build up our model we assume that the consumer 5 We suppose that the externality a¤ects all consumers'utility in the same way.
with the highest valuation for quality is willing to pay twice the marginal cost of the lowest quality variant: > 2cq. Private certi…ers can make use of green advertisement, denoted by with 2 [0; 3 ). 6 Using q( ) to denote the quality consumed by a consumer, we have
The externality term is a constant for the consumer who is not aware of the impact of her decision on the environment. Thus the externality term does not a¤ect consumer's maximization problem. However, it will not be a constant for the regulator who maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is utilitarian and is de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus, monopolist's pro…t and average environmental quality weighted by .
For notational simplicity, let us denote W i (resp. i , CS i , E i ) the social welfare (resp. the pro…t, the consumer surplus and the average environmental quality) when there is only one quality q i available on the market, and W i;j (resp. i;j , CS i;j , E i;j ) the social welfare (resp. the pro…t, the consumer surplus and the average environmental quality) when the qualities q i and q j are available on the market. Let p i be the price of the variant i.
Public intervention
Consider that the regulator sets a MQS denoted by q S . Such a standard is compulsory. The monopolist either supplies a quality at least equal to q S or exits the market. The monopolist may supply a lower quality than the standard and pretend not to do so. Thus the regulator has to monitor and certify product quality. We assume that regulator's monitoring is almost perfect. In this setting, the probability that the regulator catches the monopolist when cheating on quality is almost one.
The …xed cost of monitoring, denoted by K, is paid by the monopoly. We model the interaction between the regulator and the monopolist as a Stackelberg game:
…rst the regulator …xes a standard q S ; second the monopolist decides to produce or not at this level. Last, if it stays on the market, the monopolist chooses a price p S .
We solve the model backwards. Given the information problem, consumers do not expect a quality level higher than q S , so, the monopolist produces a unique quality variant q S or exits the market. The problem of the monopoly is the following:
is the demand for variant q S . Given a standard q S , the pro…t of the monopoly is maximum for a price p S = q S 2 + cq S .
Note that since quality is a credence attribute of the product in the absence of third party information disclosure on quality, under the unregulated equilibrium, consumers would not expect but the lowest quality variant, q. The monopolist would supply then, the lowest environmental quality level q at a price p = q 2 + cq .
The regulator chooses q S that maximizes social welfare, W S , under the monopolist pricing rule, p S . After computations we obtain the following value for the minimum quality standard:
The introduction of the standard a¤ects the quality and the price of the monopolist product. Its impact on consumer surplus, monopolist's pro…t and average environmatal quality is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (i)With the introduction of the MQS, average environmental quality, E, increases with respect to the unregulated equilibrium. Consumer surplus and pro…ts may also increase for q su¢ ciently small. (ii) For su¢ ciently large we have a range of K for which the monopolist will not participate although it is optimal.
Proof. In the appendix.
The MQS increases social welfare by increasing average environmental quality, E. Since the hedonic price (
) of the good increases with q S , less consumers are active in the market and consumers buying it bene…t from a higher quality. The bene…t of a higher quality level is particularly high when q is small, in which case, both, pro…t and consumer surplus increase with the introduction of the MQS.
The NGO regime
In the absence of public intervention, we want to investigate the impact of the existence of an NGO label on pro…ts, consumer surplus and environmental quality.
The NGO is a green nonpro…t institution which objective is to maximize average environmental quality. To realize such a task, the NGO has two instruments: the label and the green advertisement. The label awarded by the NGO certi…es that the monopolist product satis…es certain quality standards. It provides consumers with credible information on the environmental quality of the labelled variant otherwise unobservable. We assume that the certi…cation technology is the same for all the institutional frameworks, i.e. monitoring is almost perfect and the cost of monitoring equals K. It is widely observed that environmental nonpro…t organizations use the media to promote a label and increase awareness of consumers toward environmental issues. 7 The green advertisement persuades consumers to buy the labelled quality variant. We denote by the level of green advertisement. We assume an exogenous level of green advertisement. The NGO can choose N 2 f0; g. The impact of the green advertisement on the utility of consumers that buy the labelled variant with quality q N is N q N q . The cost of the advertisement is In a second stage, the monopolist either accepts or rejects the label. In case of acceptance, to bene…t from discrimination, the monopolist produces the lowest quality variant and the labelled one, and set di¤erentiated prices for both. In the third and last stage, consumers buy the product and pro…ts are realized.
To understand the impact of the green advertisement we develop the consumers choice stage. The green advertisement does not a¤ect the consumer 1 , indi¤erent between buying the product with the lowest quality or not buying it:
A consumer 2 is indi¤erent between buying the labelled variant q N or buying the lowest quality variant q when:
7 Examples of institutions making green advertisement can be found in the Global Ecolabelling Network (GEN), an international non-pro…t association of third-party, environmental performance labelling organizations. See the mission statement of GEN at http://www.gen.gr.jp. See also Eco-Action, Citizen Campaign for the Environment (CCE) among others.
The equilibrium price of the lowest quality variant is, p = q 2 + cq . However, the price of the labelled variant increases with the green advertisement allowing the monopolist to get an extra green premium from the labelled good,
Average quality under the monopolist pricing rule is:
The monopolist will accept to buy the label only if pro…ts are higher than in the unregulated equilibrium. The monopolist participation constraint is given by u;N u K 1 2 2 N > 0. We assume the monopolist participation constraint is satis…ed. General conditions are described in Lemma 1. Therefore, the equilibrium quality variant for the labelled product chosen by the NGO is q N that maximizes E u;N :
The green advertisement allows to increase average environmental quality boosting the demand of the high quality variant, see (5). It also increases the price at which the labelled variant is sold, so it increases monopolistic revenues but high levels of may decrease monopolist's pro…t by the fee. The following Lemma proves the pro…tability of a (small) green advertisement.
Lemma 1 If the cost of monitoring K is su¢ ciently small, the monopolist always accepts to buy the label for a su¢ ciently small level of green advertisement, > 0.
, the monopolist participation constraint is satis…ed for all .
At this point we want to compare the performance of an eco-label certi…ed by the NGO and a MQS set by the regulator. The social welfare comparison of these two regimes gives ambiguous results provided the many e¤ects we have to take into account. Obviously since environmental quality is maximized under the NGO regime, the eco-label awarded by the NGO will generate higher social welfare the higher the marginal social bene…t from average environmental quality, , is. On the consumers and monopolist side, both bene…t from the higher variety under the Proof. In the appendix.
The gain from di¤erentiation, in the NGO regime, will be smaller the lower the lowest quality available, q, is. The probably excessive di¤erentiation explains why the middle type consumer, with willingness to pay between u;S and S;N in Figure   1 , is better o¤ under the MQS regime, she …nds q very small and q N too high. The monopolist, though, may prefer such excessive di¤erentiation for high levels of since q S approaches q N as increases.
Interaction between the NGO and the regulator
In this section we suppose that both the NGO and the regulator are active in the market. We study the e¤ects of the presence of an NGO on the optimal standard setting. We assume the regulator and the NGO play simultaneously. The monopolist buys the label if the pro…t from selling two variants, the labelled one and the MQS, is higher than the pro…t from selling a unique quality variant at the MQS level.
In case the monopolist chooses to produce the two quality levels, he has to pay 2K + 2 N 2 (the monitoring cost to the NGO and the regulator plus the cost of the green advertisement). The NGO's problem is: For the moment, we ignore the monopolist participation constraint, indeed for K su¢ ciently low the monopolist participation constraint will be satis…ed at = 0.
First note that the NGO will propose to label the product at the same quality level
, as without regulator intervention. Second, notice that the average environmental quality E SN;N decreases with the regulator's MQS, q SN .
The regulator chooses the MQS given the level of green advertisement and the labelled quality variant. Under the regulator policy, it is compulsory to produce at least at the MQS. The regulator's problem is: The best response of the regulator is q SN = max
; q .
it is:
The regulator's MQS is a decreasing and concave function of . Given that the MQS chosen by the regulator is decreasing in the NGO is able to reduce the standard level by making use of the green advertisement, . The highest value for the MQS is q SN (0) = 4c .
If the standard is stringent, q SN > q, K still needs to be su¢ ciently small to 8 We do not consider d = 0 because for any value of qSN it will be pro…table for the NGO to introduce a label (whenever the monopolist participation constraint is satis…ed). Notice that ESN;N in (7) could be rewritten as
) ; which is unambiguously higher than
; given that qS qN and qSN qN . Proof. In the appendix.
The introduction of the MQS decreases the demand for the labelled variant compared to the NGO regime and this causes a decrease in average environmental quality. The NGO then prefers the standard to be as low as possible. Both instruments, the label and the green advertisement reduces the level of the optimal MQS set by the regulator.
We expected to have less public intervention for low, but the opposite happened (q SN is decreasing in for N > 0). The higher is the better the NGO regime is in terms of social welfare, since it maximizes average environmental quality. Thus, it is natural to have less intervention for high.
In the presence of a private certi…er the MQS task is to correct for the excessive di¤erentiation imposed by the NGO that sets q N irrespective of q. For high, such a task would be of lesser importance than to correct the externality associated with quality.
Although eco-labels can be performed by any third party able to monitor and certify the quality of the product, many choose to be non-pro…t. The mission statement of many of the nonpro…t institutions awarding eco-labels is to increase environmental quality. There is evidence that nonpro…t institutions follow their mission (Steinberg, 1986; Salamon et al., 2000) , which strongly validates our previous analysis.
Nevertheless, given the variety of institutional arrangement certifying environmental attributes: public, NGO and private for-pro…t; in the next section we also explore what would be the equilibrium in quality and green advertisement if the private certi…er would be a pro…t maximizing certi…er.
Private Certi…er regime
In this section we consider the possibility that the label is awarded by a pro…t maximizing certi…er. Following Alexander and Harding (2003) we assume the private certi…er has all the bargaining power, so she can extract all the monopoly's surplus.
The private certi…er faces the same …xed monitoring cost as the NGO and the regulator, and may invest in green advertisement whenever pro…table. We assume, for simplicity, that the green advertisement has the same e¤ect as in the previous section and that it is equally costly.
The game goes as follows: …rst, the private certi…er announces a quality level, q P , a green advertisement level P 2 f0; g and a fee for the label, F . In a second stage, the monopolist either accepts or rejects the label. The monopolist, in case of acceptance, produces two variants, the lowest quality and the labelled one, 9 and set di¤erentiated prices for both. In the third and last stage, consumers buy the product and pro…ts are realized.
The monopolist voluntarily adheres to the label and pays a …xed fee, F . He accepts to get the label whenever u;P F u . Since the private certi…er has all the bargaining power the …xed fee equals the pro…ts gain with respect to the unregulated equilibrium, F = u;P u . The PC pro…ts are:
The private certi…er chooses q P that maximizes P C P under the monopolist's pricing rule. After computation, we obtain:
Note that if P = N = the labelled quality is higher under the NGO regime than under the PC regime, indeed q N q P = 2cq+ 6c
.
The objective of the private certi…er is analogous to the monopolist's objective.
She maximizes pro…ts by di¤erentiating enough the two quality variants. The NGO, instead, maximizes environmental quality. The NGO sets a higher quality level because she does not take into account the cost of quality, only indirectly through prices and demand. The relative performance of one regime with respect to the other depends on the impact of both regimes on the consumer.
In the absence of a regulator, we next summarize the gain or loss from having a PC instead of the NGO certifying environmental quality.
Proposition 4 For P = N , (i) The NGO bene…ts high willingness to pay consumers.
(ii) The private certi…er performs better (W u;P W u;N > 0) if the social marginal value of average environmental, , is su¢ ciently small or the highest willigness to pay is su¢ ciently high, that is < 5 8 2cq .
When both the NGO and the private certi…er set the same level of green advertisement we get a natural result. Social welfare is higher under the NGO regime, compared to the PC regime, if the marginal social bene…t of average environmental quality is su¢ ciently high. High willingness to pay consumers are better o¤ under the NGO regime since q N is higher than q P . The identity of the consumer that would derive the same utility under the NGO and the PC regime 10 is increasing in . Then, the proportion of consumers that are better o¤ under the NGO regime decreases with . Consumer surplus under the NGO regime also decreases with .
1 0 By equalizing the indirect utility from buying the label under the NGO regime with the indirect utility from buying the label under the PC regimen, with equal levels of green advertisement, we …nd the consumer P;N = 1 2 + + c (qN + qP ) that is equally well under either of the regimes. The proportion of consumers better o¤ under the NGO regime is 1 F ( P;N ). Provided that both qN and qP are increasing functions of , the proportion of consumers better o¤ in the NGO regime decreases with .
Interaction between the PC and the regulator
Suppose this time, that the private certi…er and the regulator are active in the market. We assume that the regulator and the PC play simultaneously. The PC chooses the level of the quality variant, q P R , and green advertisement, P R = f0; g, to maximize its pro…t P C SP;P R given the MQS chosen by the regulator, q SP . The reaction function of the P C and regulator are q P R (q SP ) = +cq SP + P R 3c
and
; q , respectively. If we restrict to values of q SP and q P R that satisfy q SP < q P R , the relevant reaction function of the regulator implies cq P R 2 P R > 0.
We …rst explore what happens for P R = 0. We …nd that there exists a unique equilibrium characterized by q SP = 5c and q P R = 2 5c , exactly the same quality levels that maximize pro…ts in the absence of information problem. 11 This comes from the fact that q SP is independent of when P R tends to zero. In our setting if = 0 the monopolist would o¤er the social optimal quality levels if quality was observable. 12 In this setting the MQS is useless. The regulator does not need to correct the quality distortion, and with the introduction of a MQS total demand decreases (it worsen the quantity distortion). The equilibrium qualities coincide then, with the qualities chosen by the monopolist in the unregulated equilibrium if quality was observable. Those quality levels coincide with the outcome of this game given that the PC maximizes monopolists pro…t. The di¤erence comes from the cost of the information revelation: 2K.
The next Proposition describes the equilibrium quality levels in the general case when P R > 0. When P R is su¢ ciently high the regulator prefers not to intervene since the demand for the MQS variant decreases with .
Proposition 5 For P R > 0; the equilibrium levels of the MQS and the label are: (a) The public intervention case < e . Spence (1975) and Lambertini et al. (1999) . For su¢ ciently high the regulator prefers not to intervene.
Note that q SP < q SN at P R = 0. Since q SP q SN is decreasing in P R at P R = 0 then, for su¢ ciently small, the optimal MQS level will be smaller if the regulator interacts with a PC than with an NGO. In the presence of an NGO or a PC the role of the MQS is no longer to increase average environmental quality, but to correct for the otherwise excessive di¤erentiation q i q, i = N; P R in order to increase pro…ts and consumer surplus. In the PC regime such di¤erentiation is smaller since the PC maximizes monopolist pro…ts. This explains why there is even less public intervention (q SP < q SN ) when the regulator faces a PC.
Conclusion
When environmental quality has credence attributes, certi…cation is needed to produce other quality variant than the lowest one. Many agents can participate in such a certi…cation process. The private certi…ers may be for-pro…t or nonpro…t institutions. We divide these two by their objectives. We assume, as we observe in the market for eco-labels, the NGO and the PC do green advertisement, whenever pro…table. The NGO may make use of the green advertisement to avoid undesirable regulation. Indeed, high levels of green advertisement reduces the MQS level.
In the absence of a regulator we give general conditions under which the NGO performs better than the private certi…er. We …nd that the NGO always label a higher quality variant than the private certi…er.
For any level of green advertisement the presence of a private certi…er in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The role of the MQS changes, it has to correct for the otherwise excessive di¤erentiation that decreases pro…ts and consumers surplus. Optimal environmental regulation depends upon the institution interplaying with the regulator. When voluntary schemes (the label) are available, the regulator may be tougher in regulation (higher standard) in the presence of an NGO since di¤erentiation is higher under the NGO regime. On the contrary, she should be more lax in the presence of a PC.
Throughout this paper we assume an exogenous level of green advertisemnt though being the objectives of both private certi…ers di¤erent it is natural to expect both will choose di¤erent advertisement levels. 13 An endogenous level of advertisement will allow us to study its strategic choice by private certi…ers. We leave it for further research. Some other questions remain to be answer. We can consider other public policy instruments when monitoring is not perfect, trying to understand under which circumstances the regulator will o¤er a MQS or a more ‡exible policy like a label. If both NGOs and the government compete o¤ering di¤erent labels the information problem is crucial. Who consumers trust? A nonpro…t organization or a governmental agency to certify the quality of a product? Who may be easily captured by the monopolist? Here the fund-raising problem and reputation of the NGO should be reconsidered.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that q S is increasing in : Evaluating the limits of q S as approaches zero and in…nity we …nd that q S 2 [ 3c ; 2c ). (i) Consumer surplus and monopolist's pro…t are both concave in q and reach a maximum at q = 3c . For q su¢ ciently small both CS and pro…ts increase with the introduction of the standard, both may decrease if and q are su¢ ciently high. (ii) Whenever the standard is stringent and provided that q S 2c , environmental quality increases with the introduction of the MQS:
For K 2 [ e K; K ] the monopolist prefers to exit the market, though the MQS is e¢ cient. K can be rewritten as K = e K + X, with X = u + (CS S CS u ) + (E S E u ). From a simple enveloppe theorem argument we note that X is increasing in . There exist such that e K < K for > , for K 2 [ e K; K ] it will be optimal to subsidize the monopolist to pay the fee.
Proof of Lemma 1
The monopolist extra pro…ts from the label with green advertisement is, N et ( ) = q S 2c = q N ; when q = 0, there is only one variant in the market, pro…ts under the NGO regime are, then, lower than under the MQS regime provided that pro…ts are decreasing in q for q > 3c . If q is su¢ ciently high, pro…ts under the NGO regime are larger due to the gain in di¤erentiation from the label. Then, in general for ; q > 0, pro…ts under the NGO regime will be higher than under the MQS regime for high (because q S approaches q N ) and for q high (from quality di¤erentiation).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Since q SN is decreasing in N it reaches its maximum level at N = 0, thus q SN 4c < 3c q S . To prove the second statement note that q SN equals zero for = 2 9 q 27 2 + 36 + 16 2 1 9 9 + 8 < 3 . There exist < 3 such that for any value of q the regulator prefers not to intervene.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Assume that N = P = .(i) We have that N;P is the indi¤erent consumer between the NGO regime and the PC regime and is de…ned by N;P = 1 2 + c (q N + q P )
. Remember that q N > q P > q and that u;N = 1 2 + c q N + q and u;P = 1 2 + c q P + q ; thus N;P > u;N > u;P . Consumers with willingness to pay u;P < < N;P are better o¤ under the PC regime. Consumers with willingness to pay > N;P prefer the NGO regime over the PC regime. If 5( 2cq + ) 8 > 0, then, W u;P W u;N > 0. The NGO regime, then, is socially preferred to the PC regime for su¢ ciently low and is su¢ ciently high.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Here we determine the equilibrium when the regulator faces a private certi…er.
The regulator best response, q SP (q P R ), is increasing and concave for cq P R > 2 P R .
We just consider the concave part provided that q SP < q P R . Figure 3 (case a) and Figure 4 (case b) shows the shape of the best response function of the regulator. 14 .
The best response of the PC is a straight line. Let A be the value of q P R satisfying q SP (q P R ) = 0 and B the value of q P R (q SP ) when q SP = 0. De…ne e as the value of such that A = B, e < 
